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he regards as currently worthy of attention, including human rights, the principle of mutual
recognition, the impact of the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality,
and the European Public Prosecutor. On each of the issues the analysis is short but the
questions raised and recommendations put forward are at least worthy of further consideration
by practitioners, policy-makers and scholars alike. There is no doubt that this book makes a
timely and valuable addition to a still relatively short bibliography of books devoted to EU
criminal law.
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A matter of fundamental importance for the drafters of the Rome Statute (1998) of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) was striking the correct balance between the role of the
ICC and that of “states parties” in the prosecution of crimes covered by the Statute: genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and, perhaps in the future, aggression (collectively,
“ICC crimes”). When should the ICC itself prosecute an individual for violations of these
crimes – thereby taking on a role which previously had been exercised (to the extent it was
exercised at all) by sovereign states – and when should a prosecution be left to the states
themselves? If the Rome Statute’s rules for ICC involvement in a case had been too strict, the
ICC would have been precluded from prosecuting a case even where the apposite national
court was unwilling to do so – perhaps for reasons of corruption, political expedience or
inability – thereby denuding the Court of much of its raison d’étre. If the requirements for
the ICC taking on a case were not strict enough, states would have been highly unlikely to have
signed up to the Rome Statute, for fear that they would be giving away authority over an area
considered to be a sovereign prerogative.
The result was the principle of complementarity: the jurisdiction of the ICC is to be
exercised in a way that does not usurp the pre-existing jurisdiction held by states but, rather,
complements it. The Rome Statute envisages that the national state has primary competence
to investigate and prosecute ICC crimes and forecloses the ICC from deciding a case (by
deeming it inadmissible) where the matter is being (or has been) dealt with by the national
state with jurisdiction – unless the state is (or was) unwilling or genuinely unable to investigate
or prosecute a matter. As Kleffner observes, the principle of complementarity “reflects
the intention that the international is designed to supply the deficiencies of the national.
The ICC is envisaged as the mechanism through which any gaps left by the deficiencies
of domestic suppression are filled, or at least significantly narrowed.” Thus, it is only in
unusual circumstances that the ICC will become engaged in a prosecution. Indeed, it was
the complementarity provisions that led the late Robin Cook (then UK Foreign Secretary)
to advise the House of Commons that the UK had nothing to fear in signing the Rome
Statute: “Members on both sides of the House should have a robust confidence that the
British legal system has adequate remedies . . . and can satisfactorily demonstrate to the
International Criminal Court that any such allegations have been properly investigated and,
where appropriate, prosecuted. In short, British service personnel will never be prosecuted
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by the International Criminal Court because any bona fide allegation will be pursued by the
British authorities” (HC Deb 3 April 2001, col 222).
While, on its face, the concept of complementarity sounds simple enough, the content
of the concept is not always clear. It is this content that Kleffner sets himself the task of
clarifying in his excellent book. He meets this brief admirably: the book provides an extremely
valuable, thoughtful and carefully-argued study of the concept of complementarity. Closely
linked to Kleffner’s focus on the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute and their impact on
the functioning of the ICC is his consideration of the role of states in the investigation and
prosecution of ICC crimes. After all, with complementarity, it is states and not the ICC which
are envisaged as the primary actors in the prosecution of the ICC crimes under the Rome
Statute.
In his first substantive chapter, Kleffner considers the national enforcement of ICC crimes
prior to the establishment of the Rome Statute. His analysis outlines the many shortcomings on
the part of states in this regard, influenced, as they so often are, by the vicissitudes of national
politics. In the next chapter, he provides valuable background by examining the emergence
of the doctrine of complementarity in the Rome Statute. His analysis of the work of the
International Law Commission on the issue and the preparatory work leading to the Rome
Statute is rich in detail, making this part of the book an invaluable resource. In the same chapter
he contrasts the complementarity approach in the Rome Statute with previous approaches to
the relationship between national and international criminal jurisdictions. Here he considers
the Nuremberg Trial after the Second World War and the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, established by the United Nations Security
Council in 1993 and 1994 respectively. We see that with these earlier international tribunals
matters were simpler: their statutes gave them primacy over the national judicial systems.
More complicated, of course, is the system of complementarity where the authority to
prosecute is shared between the ICC and states parties. It is the complicated mechanics
of complementarity – its content and how it should be used in practice –which are the
focus of chapters IV to VI of the work. Chapter IV explores complementarity as a legal
principle (as set out in the preamble and article 1 of the Rome Statute) and as criteria for
admissibility (as provided at articles 17 and 20(3)), chapter V considers procedural issues
relating to complementarity, and chapter VI addresses complementarity and the obligation
of states parties to investigate and prosecute ICC crimes. In chapter VII, Kleffner considers
complementarity as a catalyst for compliance; he argues that complementarity provides a
mechanism through which states parties may be induced to comply with the obligation to
investigate and prosecute discussed in chapter VI.
In a final chapter Kleffner offers some conclusions in relation to the wider implications of
complementarity for the suppression of ICC crimes, in particular (1) its potential to fill the
gap left by ineffective national enforcement of the prohibition of ICC crimes, and (2) its likely
impact on the suppression of ICC crimes by national criminal jurisdictions. On the first issue,
he is not optimistic; he observes that, his conclusions in chapter VII notwithstanding, “it is
more than likely that significant obstacles to an effective national suppression of ICC crimes
will persist” (341). As to the second issue, while he observes that the uniform obligation on
states parties to investigate and prosecute ICC crimes provides a valuable tool for national
suppression, he concludes that much will depend on the underlying attitude of the state
concerned.
Of course, the meaning of complementarity under the Rome Statute has been developed
through the jurisprudence of the ICC in the time since this book was written in early
2008. Nevertheless, this excellent study of the nature and content of the complementarity
regime – and the related question of its likely impact at the national level – remains invaluable
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to anyone who wants to get to the heart of the concept, be they a student, an academic or
counsel making representations to the ICC.
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The particular focus of Earl’s book is The United States of America v Otto Ohlendorf et al,
(1947-48), popularly known as the Einsatzgruppen case. Notwithstanding that intelligence
and security work lay at the heart of the original Einsatzgruppen formations, it is for their
association with mass murder that these groups are best remembered. Their acts of barbarism
are hauntingly recorded in numerous black-and-white photographs depicting shootings on
the fringes of open graves. On average, 100,000 people per month were rounded up and
murdered between July 1941 and July 1942. However, Earl cautions against simplistic analyses
of responsibility, making specific mention of the role of local auxiliaries, notably at the infamous
Babi Yar massacre.
The Einsatzgruppen case took place subsequent to the Nuremberg International Military
Tribunal (IMT) and was US-run. It very nearly did not happen. Earl notes the “[s]heer
good luck” of investigators, in stumbling across one of the only surviving copies of
the Einsatzgruppen reports. Clearly, a general trial of the SS would not suffice. The
Einsatzgruppen’s activities demanded their own particular trial. Given the IMT’s focus on the
crime of aggressive war, this book offers a valuable analysis of legal proceedings whose focal
point was instead the Final Solution. Twenty-four individuals were indicted on three charges:
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and membership of illegal organisations. Crimes against
humanity quickly emerged as the key crime.
For historians willing to extrapolate from it, trial material is a rich reservoir. This is
clear from the work of Lawrence Douglas and Donald Bloxham regarding law’s role in the
construction of memory and the unsettled relationship between law (in particular courts)
and history. It is within this new tradition that Earl locates this book. She acknowledges
the controversies over war crimes trials’ didactic functions and the historical value of trial
testimony. Casting a historian’s forensic eye over early appearances of such testimony (in
interviews) and its evolution to trial stage is illuminating. However, trial testimony is not
inevitably historically accurate. Earl considers historians were too accepting of Ohlendorf’s
IMT testimony, and that the Einsatzgruppen trial testimony actually complicated historical
understandings of the origins of the Final Solution.
When lawyers and historians analyse trials, their approach is different (though
complementary): the lawyer’s narrow focus contrasts with the historian’s broader
contextualisation. Earl’s collective biographical method focuses upon war crimes trials as
testimonial sites and “what trial testimony reveals about perpetrators of genocide”. Prosecutors
may have been uninterested in the defendants’ motives or their identities as human beings.
However, these are key lines of inquiry for Earl who rejects simplistic characterisations of
genocide’s participants and is particularly interested in the roles played by elite members of
German society. Earl charts Einsatzgruppen Commander Ohlendorf’s career-path, looking for
